

Message Text

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TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 164627 TOSEC 060137

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT NICOSIA 2179 ACTION SECSTATE INFO ATHENS AND
ANKARA 11 JUL 75

QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 2179

EXDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR GR TU CY

SUBJECT: CYPRUS TALKS: US SUPPORT; PROPOSED MESSAGES FROM SECRETARY

REF: ATHENS 5099

1. SUMMARY. TO DEMONSTRATE CONTINUING USG CONCERN FOR
CYPRUS SOLUTION AND HELP BALANCE-GREEK REACTIONS TO
ADMINISTRATION EFFROTS ON RESUMPTION OF AID TO TURKEY, WE
RECOMMEND MESSAGES FROM SECRETARY TO CHAGLAYANGIL, BITSIOS
AND MAKARIOS. WE HOPE TURKEY CAN BE BROUGHT TO SEE FLEXIBILITY
AT VIENNA III AS LAST OPPORTUNITY TO CUT MAKARIOS OFF AT THE
PASS BEFORE HE HEADS FOR UNGA AND INTERNATIONALIZATION.
END SUMMARY.

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2. WE, TOO, HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING DESIRABILITY OF SOME US
ACTION IN PERIOD BEFORE VIENNA III TO TRY TO ENSURE THAT US
IS NOT BLAMED FOR HAVING SLACKENED IT INTEREST IN A CYPRUS
SOLUTION AND THAT CLERIDES-DENKTASH NEGOTIATION UNDER WALKDEIM

IS SUSTAINED. THIS WILL BE DIFFICULT IF WE ARE AT THE SAME TIME TO AVOID BECOMING THE WHIPPING BOY FOR THE GREEKS IF TURKS REMAIN UNWILLING MAKE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION AND TALKS EITHER DO NOT TAKE PLACE OR BREAK DOWN.

3. WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT SEVERAL ELEMENTS, SOME UNDOUBTEDLY SELF-EVIDENT, IN PRESENT SITUATION.

A. WE HAVE IN PAST SUGGESTED TO THE GREEKS THAT IF THEY ARE PATIENT TURKEY WILL COME UP WITH SOMETHING. IT HAS NOT, AND OUR CREDIBILITY AND AUTHORITY AS LEADER OF THE ALLIANCE ARE ON THE LINE IN THEIR VIEW. WITH AMBASSADOR KUBISCH, BITSIOS WAS POLITE, BUT HIS REMARKS HAD BITE AND HIS FEELINGS ARE DOUBLED IN SPADES IN THE SELF-PREOCCUPIED CYPRUS ATMOSPHERE.

B. US ADMINISTRATION IS SEEN TO BE WORKING MIGHTILY TO RESUME SOME MEASURE OF MILITARY AID TO TURKEY. BUT, TO GREEKS, THIS COMES ACROSS PRIMARILY AS OUT OF CONCERN FOR RETENTION OF US FACILITIES IN TURKEY AND ONLY DISTANTLY RELATED TO PROGRESS ON THE CYPRUS ISSUE-- DESPITE REPEATED US STATEMENTS TO CONTRARY. ON CYPRUS AND OTHER GREEK INTERESTS, GREEKS CONSIDER THEY HAVE SEEN LITTLE FROM US OF LATE.

C. MAKARIOS IS PUSHING HARD TO HAVE VIENNA III TAKE PLACE EXACTLY ON TIME PRECISELY BECAUSE HE WANTS TO EXPOSE THE TURKS, BREAK OFF, AND SET HIS SIGHTS ON UNGA AND INTERNATIONALIZATION. HIS OBJECT IS TO DIVERT HIS GREEK CYPRIOTS' ATTENTION FROM THEIR FRUSTRATIONS BY WHAT HE WELL KNOWS TO BE UNPRODUCTIVE THEATER IN TERMS OF REAL PROGRESS. HE HAS NOW OBTAINED BROAD BACKING FOR THIS COURSE (GOC HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND NATIONAL COUNCIL -- FBIS AT 081613Z).

D. WHAT TURKS SEEM TO BE PREPARED TO OFFER AT VIENNA III, AT LONG LAST, WILL PLAY DIRECTLY INTO MAKARIOS' HANDS. THEIR LONG SINCE PREPARED PAPER ON POWERS OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WILL CERTAINLY BE UNACCEPTABLE TO GOC ALTHOUGH WALKHEIM MIGHT BE ABLE TO GRASP THIS TO ARGUE FOR CONTINUED NEGOTIATION IF BOTH SIDES CONFIDENTIAL

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TABLE THEIR VERSIONS). ON PRESENT EVIDENCE, WE BELIEVE CLERIDES WILL GO TO VIENNA WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REJECT OUT OF HAND PROPOSAL FOR INTERIM GOVERNMENT -- THE PROBABLE SECOND TURKISH "OFFER".

E. IF TURKS CONTINUE ON THEIR PRESENT PATH, MAKARIOS WILL GET HIS WAY, REALISTIC NEGOTIATION AND CLERIDES WILL BE DISCREDITED (LARGELY THE CASE HERE ALREADY), AND US LIKELY TO BE FACED BY CYPRUS DEBATE AT FALL UNGA FULL OF UNPLEASANT CHOICES AND NEGATIVE IN ITS PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS.

4. REVIEWING MEANS WHEREBY US MIGHT, BEFORE VIENNA III, DEMONSTRATE ITS CONCERN FOR GREEK AND TURKISH INTERESTS ALIKE, GIVE A BOOST TO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, AND YET

AVOID THE CONDEMNATION THAT WOULD FOLLOW IF WE AROUSE EXPECTATIONS THAT TURN OUT TO BE UNREQUITED, WE FAVOR ORAL MESSAGES FROM THE SECRETARY TO CHAGLAYANGIL, BITSION AND MAKARIOS.

5. AMBASSADOR KUBISCH IN REFTTEL RECOMMENDS LINE FOR USE WITH BITSIOS.

6. WITH CHAGLAYANGIL, I WOULD HOPE WE COULD GO BEYOND GENERAL QUERY SUGGESTED BY BITSIOS. WE FEEL IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE REFER TO MAKARIOS' PRESUMED STRATEGY AND POINT OUT THAT VIENNA III OFFERS THE MAIN AND PROBABLY LAST OPPORTUNITY BLOCK THIS BEFORE UNGA. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO TRY TO PERSUADE TURKEY TO INSTRUCT DENKTASH AT VIENNA TO BE WILLING TO DISCUSS ALL ISSUES WITHOUT COMMITMENT -- INCLUDING PARTICULARLY TERRITORY AND REFUGEES -- AND DROP INSISTENCE THAT TURKS' VERSION OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BE AGREED BEFORE OTHER ASPECTS CAN BE CONSIDERED. TURKS MIGHT ALSO BE URGED TO ANNOUNCE BEFORE VIENNA III TROOP REDUCTION (WHICH WE BELIEVE HAS ALREADY TAKEN PLACE) ALONG LINES MY EARLIER PERSONAL SUGGESTION TO DENKTASH (PARA 7 NICOSIA 1931). GOT WILL CERTAINLY UNDERSTAND THAT ANY RESUMPTION OF AID WILL CARRY REQUIREMENT THAT PRESIDENT REPORT PROGRESS ON CYPRUS.

7. WITH MAKARIOS, THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE MIGHT RE-STATE OUR VIEW ON AID REVERSAL, OUR HOPE THAT THIS WILL REMOVE IMPEDIMENT TO CYPRUS PROGRESS, IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO PROGRESS IN VIENNA III, AND SAY THAT THIS VIEW BEING COMMUNICATED IN ANKARA. MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

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MIGHT ADD THAT WE HAD GIVEN THOUGHT TO CONVEYING OUR VIEWS AND ASCERTAINING CURRENT ATTITUDES OF PARTIES BY DESPATCHING SENIOR US OFFICIAL TO CAPITALS BEFORE VIENNA III BUT THAT, ON CONSIDERATION, WE HAD CONCLUDED TURKEY MORE LIKELY RESPOND POSITIVELY TO NON-PUBLIC APPROACH.

8. AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO ORAL MESSAGES COMMUNICATED THROUGH AMBASSADORS, WE HAVE CONSIDERED RECOMMENDING THAT SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL (ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN) CONVEY THEM THROUGH VISITS TO ATHENS AND ANKARA AND NICOSIA. HOWEVER, ON BALANCE WE CONCLUDE THAT HAZARDS OF AROUSING EXPECTATIONS THROUGH SUCH A VISIBLE HAND, WHEN RESULTS IN TERMS OF TURKISH FLEXIBILITY MIGHT WELL BE NEGLIGIBLE, PROBABLY OUTWEIGH POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES.
CRAWFORD

UNQUOTE. INGERSOLL

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